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NOTES
RESTRICTING RICO UNDER FSIA
JOHN D. CORRIGAN†
“There is no more important way to avoid conflict than by
providing clear norms as to which state can exercise authority
over whom, and in what circumstances. Without that allocation
of competences, all is rancour and chaos.”1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a foreign financial services company defrauds
United States investors of millions of dollars via illegal offexchange trades of foreign currency futures. Imagine further
that the company conspired with officials from a state-owned
bank in executing the fraud. This scenario was alleged in Rosner
v. Bank of China,2 where aggrieved investors sued both the
company and the bank under the civil provision of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (“RICO”).3
Fraudulent transactions, such as those alleged in Rosner, often
give rise to civil RICO claims. Civil RICO claims are popular
because successful plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages.4 To
succeed in a civil RICO claim, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant engaged in an underlying criminal act, such as wire
fraud.5 This requirement raises a unique issue when the

†
Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.S., 2006, University of Rhode Island. I would like to
thank Professor Pepper for her help and guidance in writing this Note.
1
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW
WE USE IT 56 (1994).
2
349 F. App’x 637, 638–39 (2d Cir. 2009).
3
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006).
4
See Mark H. O’Donoghue, International Decisions: Sovereign Immunity—
Applicability of RICO to Foreign States and State Entities, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 176, 176
(1991).
5
See id. at 176–77.
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defendant, like the Bank of China, is a foreign state or an
instrumentality thereof: whether the defendant is immune
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Under the Commerce Clause, the federal government has
exclusive power to regulate foreign trade.6
Congress has
exercised this power to regulate suits against foreign sovereigns
by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(“FSIA” or “Act”).7 FSIA is the only means of suing a foreign
sovereign in United States courts, and its scope is strictly limited
to the legislative grant.8 FSIA grants jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns in civil claims, but creates a blanket rule of sovereign
immunity subject only to certain enumerated jurisdictional
exceptions.9 Because FSIA’s grant is limited to civil claims
against foreign sovereigns and an underlying criminal act is
required for a plaintiff to succeed on a civil RICO claim,10 an
important question arises: Are foreign sovereigns immune from
civil RICO claims because they are not subject to jurisdiction for
the requisite underlying criminal act needed to succeed on a
RICO claim?
Despite a global wave of privatization,11 this question arises
in a number of contexts including advanced-fee fraud,12 investor
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–04 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006 & Supp. II);
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006 & Supp. II).
8
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir. 2002), abrogated on
other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
9
See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
10
See Pieczenik v. Domantis, 120 F. App’x 317, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
11
See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 62 (2001).
12
See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 1999)
(alleging that the Central Bank of Nigeria participated in advanced-fee fraud in
violation of RICO statute). The particular type of fraud detailed in Southway and
Keller, which this Note later contrasts, is known as “Nigerian 419 Fraud”—named
after the Nigerian Criminal Code section it violates. PAUL BOCIJ, THE DARK SIDE OF
THE INTERNET: PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY FROM ONLINE CRIMINALS
100–01 (2006). The scheme is simple: A United States company or individual is sent
an e-mail requesting urgent assistance in transferring a huge sum of money to the
United States. See id. at 101. Once the target agrees to help, they are confronted
with a series of fees or bribes needed to complete the transaction. See id. Lured by
the promise of outrageous profits, the investors pay the fees until they eventually
realize the fraud. See id. This type of fraud is most successful when perpetrators
gather information on the target before contact is initiated. See id. at 102. The FBI
estimates that in the United States, victims lost between $17 million and $54
million from 2001 to 2002. Id. at 103.
7

CP_Corrigan (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:09 PM

2010]

RESTRICTING RICO UNDER FSIA

1479

fraud,13 and misappropriation of trade secrets.14 Although courts
have addressed this question before, no clear trend has emerged
as to whether the lack of criminal jurisdiction over the foreign
sovereign defeats the criminal act element in a civil RICO
claim.15 This Note explores two competing interpretations:
(1) that so long as the criminal act underlying the civil RICO suit
falls within a FSIA exception, the sovereign may not raise
immunity,16 and (2) that absent a grant of criminal jurisdiction, a
foreign sovereign is not amenable to suit in a civil RICO claim.17
This Note asserts that the courts should find foreign sovereigns
immune from civil RICO suits.
Exploring the two FSIA interpretations requires an
understanding of both statutes. To better understand FSIA’s
framework, Part I discusses the underlying theories of immunity
that gave rise to its development, as well as the congressional
intent behind it. To illustrate civil RICO’s quasi-criminal nature,
Part I also sketches the development of RICO. Part II explores
the two competing interpretations of RICO in light of FSIA by
detailing two circuit court cases with substantially similar facts
yet diverging outcomes: Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria18
and Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria.19 Part II also briefly
examines the dispositions of other courts on civil RICO claims
brought under FSIA. Finally, Part III analyzes the diverging
arguments in light of the statutory text, case law, international
law, and policy considerations. Part III argues that granting
immunity in civil RICO claims better reconciles FSIA’s text and
purpose, and better aligns U.S. practice with international law.
Part III concludes that, in light of policy concerns, courts should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in
civil RICO claims.

13
See, e.g., Rosner v. Bank of China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(alleging the Bank of China aided a racketeering enterprise centered on foreign
currency investment fraud).
14
See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. 838, 840
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (describing a claim arising from an alleged illegal transfer of trade
secrets to French-owned copper manufacturer).
15
See infra Part II.
16
See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1215–16.
17
See Keller, 277 F.3d at 821.
18
198 F.3d at 1212–14.
19
277 F.3d at 814, 821.

CP_Corrigan (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:09 PM

1480

I.

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1477

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND CIVIL RICO

A brief overview of both FSIA and RICO provides important
insight into the underlying issues. The law in effect before these
statutes were enacted, both in and outside the United States,
provides a historical background that is important to
understanding why Congress enacted these laws and their
intended application. Part I.A discusses how absolute and
restrictive immunity theories shaped United States immunity
doctrines and presents FSIA’s current framework. Because of
civil RICO’s criminal acts requirement, issues arise in applying it
to foreign sovereigns, who are generally immune from criminal
prosecution.20 To better understand this issue, Part I.B briefly
discusses the history of RICO and its quasi-criminal nature.
A.

The Background and Framework of FSIA

1.

The Absolute Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity

Absolute immunity theory arose from the concept that states
were of equal standing and thus, did not possess dominion over
each other.21 This theory was grounded in comity and reciprocity
concerns22 and dictated that sovereigns were immune from
jurisdiction absent consent.23 The United States adopted this
international theory in 1812 in the seminal case of The Schooner
Exchange v. M’Faddon.24 There, two United States citizens
sought to reclaim title of a vessel that had been commandeered
by the French Navy.25 In analyzing France’s claim that the
United States lacked jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall looked
20

See infra Part II.
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 220 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2007) (citing The Schooner
Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812)); HIGGINS, supra note 1,
at 78–79; Dean Brockbank, The Sovereign Immunity Circle: An Economic Analysis of
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 2 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1, 2 (1994).
22
Though short of an “absolute obligation,” comity in the context of
international law involves a “due regard” for “the legislative, executive, [and]
judicial acts of [other] nation[s].” See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for
International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169, 175 (1999–2000); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (9th ed. 2009).
23
See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1215 n.5.
24
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 133.
25
See id. at 117.
21
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to international law.26 Marshall concluded that “[t]he jurisdiction
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute,” and therefore, a sovereign’s immunity could not be
disturbed absent consent.27 Because the French Navy had seized
the vessel in French territorial waters and under color of French
law, the United States did not have jurisdiction to compel the
replevin.28 The Schooner Exchange formed the basis of the
United States common law doctrine of sovereign immunity for
more than a century.29 Under this doctrine, courts decided
immunity claims as matters of law and continued to look to
international law to resolve novel immunity claims.30 Despite
the foreign relations concerns inherent to immunity decisions,
courts ignored executive branch views.31 In 1943, however, an
instance of executive intervention prompted a shift in judicial
policy that reframed immunity as a political issue.32
Two cases marked the shift in United States immunity
doctrine, under which immunity determinations turned on
foreign relation concerns, rather than the rule of law. First, in
Ex parte Republic of Peru, the Court granted immunity to a
Peruvian government-owned commercial vessel solely because
the Department of State had formally recognized Peru’s claim of
immunity.33 The Court explained that wrongs wrought by
26

See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 219.
Id. at 220 (quoting The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136). The
case arose from a libel action brought by United States citizens John McFaddon and
William Greetham, who asserted title over the Balaou, a French ship of war, in
United States district court. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117–18.
McFaddon and Greetham were in fact the original owners of the vessel—then named
the The Schooner Exchange—which was captured by the French Navy en route to St.
Sebastian, Spain and converted into a French warship in December of 1810. See id.
at 117; JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS:
A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 416 (2d ed. 2006). In August of 1811, inclement
weather forced the Balaou to seek port in Philadelphia, where McFaddon and
Greetham sued. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117; DUNOFF ET
AL., supra. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice
Marshall held that the Court lacked judicial jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. The
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147.
28
See id.
29
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21.
30
See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 569, 576 (1926) (upholding
immunity in a commercial claim on international law grounds where an Italian
government-owned merchant vessel delivered damaged cargo).
31
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21.
32
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943).
33
See id. at 589 (“The certification and the request that the vessel be declared
immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the
27
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friendly sovereigns “are [best] righted through diplomatic
negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial
proceedings.”34 Two years later, in the factually similar Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman,35 the Court denied Mexico’s immunity
claim because the Department of State refused to recognize the
claim.36 In Hoffman, the Court made clear that determinations
on immunity should come from the executive branch.37 After
Ex parte Peru and Hoffman, immunity determinations turned
on Department of State “suggestion[s]” regarding a state’s claim
of immunity, because the courts considered the suggestions
binding.38 This politically driven practice, which continued to
rely on absolute immunity principles, created uncertainty and
fast became unworkable in the modern world.39
2.

The Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity

By the mid-twentieth century, many European states had
replaced absolute immunity with the so-called “restrictive
immunity theory.”40 Restrictive immunity gained popularity as
foreign sovereigns increasingly became involved in commercial
transactions with private parties, prompting a need to protect
the private actors in such transactions.41 Under restrictive
immunity, sovereigns remained immune for public acts, such as
expropriations, but were not immune for private or commercial
acts, such as contractual obligations.42
After World War II, the United States itself became
increasingly involved in foreign litigation resulting from

political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes
with the proper conduct of our foreign relations.”).
34
Id.
35
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
36
See id. at 35–36.
37
See id. (“It is . . . not for the courts to deny an immunity which [the Executive
branch] has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity [where it has not].”).
38
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 221.
39
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 419.
40
See GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND
PROGNOSTIC VIEW 33 (1984).
41
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Dep’t of State’s Acting Legal Advisor, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984,
984–85 (1952) [hereinafter The Tate Letter].
42
See BADR, supra note 40, at 21–22; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21,
at 221; DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 419.
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international trade.43 This experience and the rise of state-run
industries demonstrated the need to protect American parties in
transactions with foreign state-owned entities.44 Once again, the
United States looked to international law to shape
its own doctrine. In 1952, the Department of State noted the
growing acceptance of the restrictive immunity doctrine abroad
and incorporated the theory into its immunity doctrine.45 Though
nominally guided by restrictive immunity theory, Department of
State decisions were heavily influenced by political pressures.46
As a result, implementation of restrictive immunity theory was
fraught with inconsistency.47
Concerned over the lack of
uniformity and the friction such decisions caused in international
relations, Congress sought to shift the decisionmaking process to
the courts by codifying the restrictive immunity theory under
FSIA.48
3.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976

This Part discusses the congressional objectives behind FSIA
and describes the framework of the statute.
To resolve
uniformity and foreign relation concerns, Congress codified
restrictive immunity under FSIA and shifted responsibility for
Codifying
immunity determinations back to the courts.49
restrictive immunity removed political pressures by making
immunity decisions turn on questions of law.50 Codification also

aligned United States practice with international practice and

43
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 219;
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 419–20.
44
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43.
45
See The Tate Letter, supra note 41 (noting that the United States had
followed a policy of not claiming immunity with respect to claims against publicly
owned or operated merchant vessels).
46
See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 222 (“[T]he State Department
was subjected to diplomatic and political pressures in connection with immunity
decisions. This produced unpredictable, sometimes unprincipled, results . . . .”).
47
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6604–06.
48
See id.
49
See id. at 6606.
50
See id.
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provided more consistent application of restrictive immunity
theory.51
To further ensure uniformity, Congress made FSIA the
exclusive means of suing foreign sovereigns in United States
courts.52 FSIA grants civil jurisdiction over all suits against
foreign sovereigns,53 allowing United States citizens to “resolve
ordinary legal disputes” in United States courts.54 FSIA’s broad
jurisdictional grant is tempered by a general rule of immunity,
unless a statutory exception applies.55 Sections 1330 and 1604 of
Chapter 28 of the United States Code work in concert to achieve
this effect.
First, § 1330 grants district courts original
jurisdiction—both subject matter and personal—over any civil
action against foreign states,56 which may be a “political
subdivision” and any “agency or instrumentality” of a state.57
Second, § 1604 grants foreign states immunity from jurisdiction
unless an enumerated exception applies or an international
agreement supersedes the statute.58 Under FSIA, sovereigns are
not entitled to immunity: (1) in terrorism claims,59 (2) when
immunity is waived,60 (3) in commercial activity claims,61 (4) in
expropriation claims,62 (5) in property claims,63 (6) in noncommercial tort claims,64 (7) in wrongful death claims,65 and
51

See id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
53
See id. § 1330.
54
Gilson v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis
added) (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Congress was explicit about this purpose:
We think that it ought to be difficult for defendants engaged in commercial
activity with substantial American contact . . . to invoke successfully
sovereign immunity when sued for underlying commercial misdeeds. This
is especially so in view of the fact that FSIA was written in great measure
to ensure that our citizens will have access to the courts in order to resolve
ordinary legal disputes.
Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
55
See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
56
Id. § 1330.
57
Id. § 1603(a).
58
See id. § 1604.
59
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006 Supp. II).
60
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II).
61
See id. § 1605(a)(2).
62
See id. § 1605(a)(3).
63
See id. § 1605(a)(4).
64
See id. § 1605(a)(5).
65
See id.
52
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(8) in counter proceedings brought by the sovereign.66 Aside from
the amended § 1605A, which provided the terrorism exception,67
there is no exception to the rule of sovereign immunity for
criminal acts.
The most commonly raised exception to immunity, and
indeed the driving force behind FSIA, is the commercial activity
exception.68 Plaintiffs raise the commercial activity exception so
frequently in large part because its definition is so broad.
Section 1603(d) defines “commercial activity” as either a course of
conduct or a single transaction that is commercial in character.69
The “character” of a transaction is “determined by reference to
[its] nature[,] . . . rather than . . . its purpose.”70 The naturepurpose distinction is widely criticized as vague and broad.71
The Supreme Court clarified the definition in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.72 There, to protect the integrity of
its then-faltering economy, Argentina unilaterally deferred
repayment on bonds it had issued to United States investors.73
The Court held the nature of bonds was commercial, even though
Argentina’s motive for deferring repayment was sovereign.74
Under the Court’s reasoning, an act is commercial “when a
foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but [as] a
private player.”75
According to the Court’s definition, so long as a foreign
sovereign is acting in a private capacity, it cannot raise
immunity. This is true whether the underlying transaction is
legal or illegal. Read this way, there is no question that a foreign
sovereign would be liable for common law fraud arising from a
contract dispute. But in a civil RICO suit, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant was indictable for some underlying criminal
66

See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006 Supp. II).
68
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43.
69
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006).
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV. 51, 61–62 (1992); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 453 cmt. b (1987); BADR, supra note 40, at
32, 87, 91, 94–96; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of
Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 222, 224–25 (1951).
72
504 U.S. 607 (1992).
73
Id. at 609.
74
Id. at 614, 617.
75
Id. at 614.
67
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act—hence RICO’s quasi-criminal nature.76
FSIA does not
provide courts with the power to indict—that is, to formally
charge a sovereign defendant through legal process.77 Indeed,
such power would be contrary to both United States policy and
international legal norms.78 If a United States court lacks
jurisdiction to indict a sovereign defendant, is it competent to
hear a civil RICO claim brought against one?
B.

The History, Purpose, and Meaning of RICO

The civil RICO statute subjects defendants to “potentially
devastating liability.”79 Although it was enacted to combat
organized crime,80 the statute’s broad scope of prohibitions and
treble damages provision have incentivized novel and expansive
civil applications, particularly in the commercial context.81
1.

History and Purpose

RICO resulted from a lengthy legislative effort to combat
organized crime.82 The roar of the 1920s heralded the rise of
organized crime in the United States.83 Prohibition, increased
narcotics use, and economic depression allowed organized crime
syndicates to gain a foothold in the American economy.84
Prohibition in particular incentivized the consolidation of

numerous
76

criminal

activities,85

which

rendered

federal

See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 841.
78
See infra Part III.A.
79
O’Donoghue, supra note 4, at 178.
80
See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q.
1009, 1013 (1980).
81
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see, e.g., Rosner v. Bank of China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
82
See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 80.
83
See Frank D’Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the Outer Limits of
RICO’s “Affecting Commerce” Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2080 (2008).
84
Id.
85
See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 213, 226 (1984). Bradley noted that
prohibition created a need for large-scale distribution networks comprising
smugglers, distillers, bottlers, warehouses and trucks as well as numerous
77
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prosecution of the discrete underlying crimes less and less
effective.86
The legislature responded slowly and incrementally to
bolster criminal law so that prosecutors could target the
hierarchy of criminal organizations, rather than the low-level
criminals who carried out the dirty work. At first, Congress
enacted federal kidnapping laws and later, racketeering laws,
which focused on prosecuting the criminal organizations, rather
than prosecuting the individual criminals.87 Despite marginal
success, the need for more effective measures was apparent.88
Later, as organized crime infected legitimate businesses,89
Congress shifted focus away from a pure prosecutorial approach
to include regulatory reforms.90 Notably, civil litigation was seen
as a potential weapon against organized crime,91 turning citizens

retailing outlets (speakeasies). Obviously this required far more
organization than did operating a house of prostitution or a bookie joint,
and organized crime, as we know it today, was born—the unwanted child of
an unfortunate act of Congress.
Id.
86

See Michael Morrissey, Note, Structural Strength: Resolving a Circuit Split in
Boyle v. United States with a Pragmatic Proof Requirement for RICO Associated-inFact Enterprises, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1943 (2009).
87
See Bradley, supra note 85, at 229–32. Washington’s first response was the
Federal Kidnapping Act of 1932, which was passed in response the kidnapping of the
Lindbergh baby. Id. at 229 & n.106. Despite federalism concerns, legislation in 1934
expanded the coverage of the Lindbergh Law, prohibiting “interference with
interstate commerce by [way of] threats, force or violence.” Id. at 231. The effect of
organized crime on legitimate business was a primary concern of the Kefauver
Committee of the 1950s and Attorney Generals Kennedy and Katzenbach in the
1960s. See id. at 236–48.
88
Id. at 235.
89
See Morrissey, supra note 86. The Kefauver Committee indentified numerous
industries that were being purchased with the profits from organized crime,
including: advertising, amusement, appliances, automobiles, cigarettes, coal,
communications, steel, and transportation. S. REP. NO. 82-307, at 170–81 (1951).
Among the concerns was organized crime’s ability “to compete unfairly with
legitimate” business persons. See S. REP. NO. 81-2370, at 16 (1950).
90
See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 80, at 1015 n.25. In 1965, President
Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to study the
problem of organized crime. See D’Angelo, supra note 83. Katzenbach’s commission
recommended the use of civil litigation and regulatory reforms, as well as traditional
criminal prosecution, as a means of fighting organized crime. Id. at 2080–81.
91
See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 208 (1967) (“Law enforcement is not
the only weapon that governments have to control organized crime. Regulatory
activity can have a great effect.”).
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into “private attorneys general.”92 Thus, Congress enacted RICO
and created a civil private right of action whereby victims of
statutorily proscribed criminal activity could sue in federal court
for treble damages.93
2.

Interpreting the Civil RICO Statute

Civil RICO turned victims into private prosecutors by
creating a private right of action and prescribing treble
damages.94 To recover in a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant engaged in a “racketeering activity”95—
that is, “any act which is indictable under” state laws and several
enumerated federal statutes.96 The predicate RICO offenses
include the ubiquitous 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which criminalizes any
monetary fraud engaged by wire, radio, or telecommunications.97
What Congress meant by “indictment” becomes a central issue
when the defendant is sovereign and immune from indictment.98
Although Congress expressly instructed courts to liberally
construe RICO’s provisions to “effectuate its remedial
purposes,”99 the most natural reading of the civil RICO statute
indicates that a defendant must be subject to criminal
prosecution, or “indictable,” for victims to maintain the suit.
While there is no requirement that the defendant have actually
been indicted or convicted, the implication is that the defendant
must be amenable to the indictment.100 This is clear from the
Supreme Court’s holding in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.101: The
predicate offenses are satisfied when the defendant could be
indicted for an act.102 Logically, it follows that if a court lacks the
power to indict a defendant, then the defendant cannot be
indicted and the civil RICO claim must fail. This logic has been
92
Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103,
137 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)).
93
See id. at 106.
94
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
95
Id. § 1962(b)–(d).
96
See id. § 1961(1).
97
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. II).
98
See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488–89 (1985).
99
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922.
100
See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488 (“[R]acketeering activity consists not of acts for
which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be.”).
101
473 U.S. 479.
102
See id. at 488.
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used by circuit courts to uniformly bar claims against the federal
government on the grounds that it is not indictable.103 This same
rationale has been used to bar claims against state
legislatures,104
state
institutions,105
and
municipal
106
Despite the general consensus that domestic
governments.
sovereigns are not indictable and cannot be subject to a civil
RICO claim, courts are split when the sovereign is foreign.107
II. THE COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS OF FSIA IN LIGHT OF CIVIL
RICO
Federal courts are divided as to whether or not FSIA grants
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in civil RICO claims. Courts
diverge because RICO requires predicate underlying criminal
acts and FSIA does not grant criminal jurisdiction or provide any
exception to the general rule of immunity for criminal acts.
When examining the conflict, three different contentions emerge.
First, courts disagree on the scope of FSIA. While courts agree
that FSIA does not confer criminal jurisdiction, they are split as
to whether FSIA’s silence on criminal jurisdiction means that
§ 1604’s presumption of immunity even applies.108 Second, courts
disagree as to whether the actor or merely the act itself must be
“indictable” under RICO.109 Finally, underlying this split is a
general disagreement over the fundamental concepts of sovereign
immunity.

103
See, e.g., Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The
assertion . . . that [a federal agency] was engaged in a RICO conspiracy under
section 1962(d) was patently defective as a matter of law, since it is self-evident that
a federal agency is not subject to state or federal criminal prosecution.”); see also
McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the FDIC not
indictable for the predicate racketeering activity and thus not amenable to a civil
RICO suit).
104
See, e.g., Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n of Ill., 729 F.2d 1128,
1129–30 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that state legislators are immune from civil
RICO claims).
105
See, e.g., Gaines v. Tex. Tech Univ., 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(finding that state institutions are immune from civil RICO claims).
106
See, e.g., Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D. Okla.
1986) (finding a municipal government incapable of forming the requisite mens rea
necessary to engage in racketeering activity).
107
See infra Part II.
108
Compare Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 2002), with
Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999). But cf. United
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 1997).
109
See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1214–15 & n.6.
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Part II of this Note explores the approaches used by the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits in addressing the issues inherent to
civil RICO claims against foreign sovereigns, and briefly
examines the disposition of other circuits. Part II.A explores this
issue in the context of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Southway v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, which held that FSIA did not render the
foreign state defendants immune from a civil RICO claim.110 Part
II.B examines the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Keller v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, which explicitly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s
rationale.111 Finally, Part II.C examines the disposition of other
circuits with respect to any conflict between FSIA and RICO.
A.

The Tenth Circuit: Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria

The Tenth Circuit approaches civil RICO claims against
foreign sovereigns as if they were any other civil claim. That is,
so long as there is an exception to FSIA’s grant of immunity, the
case may proceed. One case applying this approach is Southway
v. Central Bank of Nigeria.
Southway involved an advanced-fee fraud scheme, whereby
individuals purporting to represent the Central Bank of Nigeria
(“CBN”) duped plaintiffs into forwarding them money in the
hopes of receiving a greater sum in return.112 In November 1995,
an individual claiming to be a representative of the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) contacted an attorney
in Colorado offering a lucrative deal.113
The purported
representative claimed that with the attorney’s help, he could
access a $21 million “over-invoiced” contract that NNPC had
made with a foreign company.114 Under the proposed agreement,
the attorney would claim to be a subsidiary of that company and

would wire the funds to his own account in the United States.115
In compensation for his troubles, the attorney “would receive a
percentage of the funds.”116

110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 1215.
277 F.3d at 820.
Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 994 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Colo. 1998).
See id. at 1302.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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The attorney agreed and complied with the representative’s
instructions to the letter.117 When the attorney sought payment,
however, additional alleged representatives of both the NNPC
and the CBN claimed that a series of “advanced fees” were
necessary to complete the transaction.118 The attorney, “short the
funds necessary to take full advantage of this opportunity,”
convinced others to “invest” with him to cover the fees.119
Unfortunately, the money never materialized.120
The investors sued in the United States District Court,
District of Colorado, alleging RICO violations by the Federal
Republic of Nigeria (“FRN”) and the CBN.121 The FRN and CBN
moved to dismiss, asserting FSIA “did not provide . . . [for]
jurisdiction over [the] civil RICO claims.”122 The district court
denied the motion.123
After the district court denied immunity, the Tenth Circuit,
on interlocutory appeal, affirmed the district court’s
holdings that: (1) the alleged fraud fell under the commercial
activity exception; and (2) FSIA did not preclude civil RICO
jurisdiction.124
Because the alleged fraud’s nature was
commercial, the court held that the commercial activity exception
applied regardless of the underlying illegality.125 The court then
rejected any specific civil RICO immunity for four reasons. First,
the court rejected the argument that Congress intended FSIA to
govern jurisdiction in criminal matters.126 Because FSIA was
silent with respect to criminal indictment, the court declined to
apply its immunity to the predicate RICO offenses.127 The court
reasoned that it “ha[d] no business attempting to define the scope

117

See id.
Id. at 1303.
119
Id. at 1303–04.
120
See id. at 1304.
121
See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999).
122
Id. at 1213.
123
See Southway, 994 F. Supp. at 1309.
124
See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1214. On remand, the court discovered that the
sovereign defendants had not in fact participated in the fraud and thus dismissed
the case against them. See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 328 F.3d 1267, 1273–74
(10th Cir. 2003). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal but made clear that there
was no immunity because the cause of action arose from a RICO violation. See id. at
1274.
125
See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1217–18.
126
See id. at 1214.
127
See id. at 1215 n.4.
118
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of foreign sovereign immunity in the first instance,”128 and that if
Congress wished for foreign sovereigns to be immune from
criminal indictment, Congress would have expressly provided
such an immunity.129 Second, the court declined to distinguish
RICO from other civil claims, despite RICO’s unique
requirements.130 Third, the court found that jurisdiction was
consistent with Congress’s purpose in codifying the restrictive
theory of immunity in FSIA.131 The court distinguished foreign
sovereign immunity from domestic sovereign immunity,
reasoning that the law had abandoned absolute immunity for
foreign sovereigns with the adoption of the Tate Letter.132
Finally, the court held that in any event, the predicate RICO
offense itself must be indictable, not the party that committed
it.133 Accordingly, the court denied immunity to the FRN and
CBN.
After the court remanded the case for further proceedings,
the FRN and CBN were able to demonstrate at trial that
although all communications appeared to be official, they were in
fact sent from imposters.134
B.

The Sixth Circuit: Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria

The Sixth Circuit’s approach to resolving the civil RICO
immunity question is diametrically opposed to the Tenth
Circuit’s approach. The Sixth Circuit considers FSIA’s failure to
provide for criminal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns to mean
that such sovereigns are not indictable for RICO’s predicate
criminal acts and thus, are immune from civil RICO suits. An
example of this approach can be seen in Keller v. Central Bank of
Nigeria.
The facts underlying Keller mirror those of Southway.
There, a purported Nigerian official called a sales representative
for a Michigan-based manufacturer of mobile medical centers.135
The official offered the deal of a lifetime: In exchange for
128

Id. at 1214–15 (citing Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d
Cir. 1988)).
129
See id. at 1215.
130
See id.
131
See id. at 1216.
132
See id. at 1215 n.5.
133
See id. at 1215 & n.6.
134
See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 328 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003).
135
See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 2002).
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exclusive distribution rights of the mobile medical centers, the
official would pay the manufacturer $6.63 million for $4.10
million worth of equipment and a $7.65 million licensing fee.136
The official promised that the Nigerian government had already
appropriated the funds137 and that the manufacturer only needed
to establish an escrow account in the United States from which
the funds would be disbursed.138 After they struck the deal, the
manufacturer established the escrow account and waited.139
When the funds did not materialize, various individuals
purporting to hold positions within the CBN and the
FRN demanded “advanced fees” from the manufacturer.140
Reluctantly, the manufacturer paid a series of fees totaling
approximately $30,000.141 Each time the manufacturer paid one
fee, the officials demanded another and postponed the transfer.142
Eventually, a purported official told the manufacturer that the
funds were ready, but that the manufacturer had to personally
collect the funds in London, England.143 Undaunted by the string
of dubious fees and broken promises, the manufacturer travelled
to London only to find that the promised courier never
appeared.144 Finally realizing the fraud, the manufacturer sued
under civil RICO in federal district court.145
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s
denial of CBN’s immunity.146 Like the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit held that allegations of criminal activity did not rob the
transaction of its commercial nature and thus, the commercial
activity exception applied;147 however, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
did not end there and was markedly different in three ways.
First, the Sixth Circuit read FSIA’s silence on criminal
jurisdiction as an indication that Congress did not intend to
provide for it—that is, a foreign sovereign could not be indicted
136

See id.
See id.
138
See id.
139
See Final Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at *6, Keller, 277 F.3d 811 (No. 003369), 2000 WL 35555622.
140
See id. at *7.
141
See Keller, 277 F.3d at 814.
142
See Final Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 139, at *6–7.
143
See id. at *7.
144
See id.
145
See Keller, 277 F.3d at 814.
146
See id. at 818.
147
See id. at 816.
137
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under FSIA.148 The Sixth Circuit recognized that its jurisdiction
was limited to “the exact degrees and character
which . . . Congress [had granted].”149 Because Congress did not
provide for criminal jurisdiction in the only relevant statute, the
court could not exercise jurisdiction over a claim that required
it.150
Second, because FSIA’s provisions were “[s]ubject to existing
international agreements,” foreign sovereigns were immune from
criminal prosecution absent a contrary international
agreement.151
The court noted that bringing a criminal
proceeding against another nation during peacetime runs counter
to United States policy.152 Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
argument that any distinction between indictable acts and
indictable actors was material.153 Relying on its own precedent,
the court determined that the actor and not the act “count[ed] for
the purposes of RICO ‘indictability.’ ”154 Thus, since civil RICO
required the defendant to be indictable and because sovereigns
could not be indicted in United States courts, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that sovereigns must be immune.155

148

See id. at 820.
Id. (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 433 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150
See id.; see also Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 436 (holding in the context of the
Alien Tort Statute, FSIA immunity is granted in cases involving alleged violations of
international law not enumerated in FSIA’s exceptions); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (“Jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts is . . . limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory
grant.”).
151
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Congress specifically omitted the term “future”
international agreements because it was deemed “misleading.” HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 43, at 6608. Congress used the term “existing” to ensure that courts
would understand that the Act did not supersede any treaties. Id. Congress intended
for all treaties, both those in existence in 1976 and those to come, to control in case
of conflict. See id. at 1616.
152
See Keller, 277 F.3d at 819–20 (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining &
Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. 838, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
153
See id. at 820–21.
154
Id. (citing Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991)); Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985) (“[R]ackeetering activity consists not
of acts for which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be.”
(emphasis added)). But see S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 (1969) (“[The] ‘racketeering
activity’ . . . must be an act in itself subject to criminal sanction . . . .”).
155
See Keller, 277 F.3d at 821.
149
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Other Circuits

Although only the Southway and Keller courts have framed
the issue in terms of indictment, other circuits have entertained
civil RICO claims against foreign sovereigns. The Second,156
Eleventh,157 and Federal Circuits158 have all held that the courts
may exercise jurisdiction under FSIA in civil RICO claims
against foreign sovereigns if the commercial activity exception
applies. The Seventh Circuit has never spoken on the issue, but
one of its district courts has declined to recognize a civil RICO
immunity rule.159 The Fifth Circuit has held that entities not

subject to indictment are immune from civil RICO jurisdiction160

156
See Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that foreign sovereigns were presumptively immune unless an exception
applied, but that commercial activity outside the U.S. with no “direct effect” on the
U.S. did not satisfy the commercial activity exception); see also Rosner v. Bank of
China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419, 424, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the alleged
activity fell within commercial activity exception of FSIA, but that it did not amount
to a RICO violation); Daly v. Castro Llanes, 30 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (dismissing a civil RICO action against a foreign bank for failing to plead with
particularity).
157
See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the FSIA does not address immunity in the criminal context, and any immunity
must be determined from the principles of The Schooner Exchange); see also United
States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758, 2007 WL 2002452, at *14 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2007)
(recognizing that Eleventh Circuit precedent bound the court from entertaining the
argument for RICO immunity under the FSIA).
158
See Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 503 F. Supp. 2d 267, 274 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (holding that the commercial activity exception applied and the court
would have jurisdiction but for the fact that the civil RICO claims were time barred).
But cf. Pieczenik v. Domantis, 120 F. App’x 317, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that
federal agencies could not be sued under RICO because they are not “person[s]
capable of violating RICO[,] . . . [they] are not subject to . . . criminal prosecution,”
and they cannot satisfy the predicate acts (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159
See Am. Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 653 F.
Supp. 861, 863–64 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
160
See McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the
FDIC is not indictable for the predicate racketeering activity and thus not amenable
to a civil RICO suit); see also St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425,
447 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Where persons associate ‘in fact’ for criminal purposes, [ ] each
person may be held liable under RICO for his [part] . . . but the association itself
cannot be.” (quoting Haroco v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th
Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)) (citation omitted)).
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and affirmed portions of a district court holding extending that
rationale to foreign sovereigns.161
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN
KELLER
This Note urges courts to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
in Keller and grant foreign sovereigns immunity in civil RICO
claims because FSIA does not empower the courts to indict the
sovereigns for RICO’s predicate criminal acts. Three major
considerations favor this broad grant of immunity under FSIA:
reconciliation of statutory construction with congressional intent,
alignment with international practice, and reduction of
transaction costs in commercial dealings with sovereigns.
A.

Statutory Construction

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning better reconciles the language
of FSIA with the underlying purposes of codifying restrictive
immunity and properly considers RICO a crime fighting statute.
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Southway, however, raises
important points that must be addressed prior to accepting the
Keller analysis.
First, while FSIA’s silence on criminal jurisdiction raises
doubts that Congress intended for FSIA immunity to apply to
foreign sovereigns in criminal cases, granting immunity in such
cases is more consistent with FSIA’s blanket immunity rule and
underlying purpose. FSIA is the only means by which United
States citizens may sue foreign sovereigns in a United States
court.162
FSIA grants civil jurisdiction but not criminal
jurisdiction; this exclusion is a signal that FSIA does not give the
courts power to indict foreign sovereigns.163 If courts cannot

161
See Dale v. Colagiovanni, 337 F. Supp. 2d 825, 842–43 (S.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d
in part, 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that because the Vatican was not
indictable for the predicate RICO acts under FSIA, it could not be sued under civil
RICO).
162
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982) (limiting the court’s jurisdiction to “subjects encompassed within a statutory
grant of jurisdiction”); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir.
2002).
163
Expressio unis est exclusio alterius. Burke v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 672,
678 (M.D. Ala. 1997); see United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)
(“[E]xpressing one item of a[n] . . . associated group or series excludes another left
unmentioned . . . .”).
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indict foreign sovereigns, then logically, foreign sovereigns are
immune from criminal jurisdiction under FSIA. Now some
courts, notably the Eleventh164 and Second165 Circuits, have
argued that FSIA’s silence on criminal jurisdiction does not
prohibit criminal indictment under common law doctrines. But
this argument does apply to FSIA claims brought by private
citizens because FSIA is the sole means for private citizens to sue
foreign sovereigns, rendering common law doctrines ineffective.166
Moreover, if FSIA’s immunity does not extend to cover criminal
acts, then why did Congress amend FSIA to remove immunity for
cases arising from terrorism?167 Not coincidentally, the very acts
covered under § 1605A—torture, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking or state sponsorship thereof168—are prohibited under
RICO’s § 1961.169 In light of the terrorism amendment, the
exclusion of any specific fraud immunity exception and FSIA’s
deafening silence on criminal jurisdiction suggest that courts
should render sovereigns immune in civil RICO claims not falling
under § 1605A.
Second, while RICO’s language speaks of indictable “acts”
and not “actors,” relevant precedent suggests that the court must
be able to indict the actor to satisfy the “predicate criminal acts”
element. The Supreme Court made clear in Sedima S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co.170 that while civil RICO does not require that the
defendant have been convicted of the underlying act, it does
require an indictable act.171 As shown in Part I.B, the circuit
courts have followed this logic to bar civil RICO claims against
164
See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“Because the FSIA [does not] address[ ] . . . foreign sovereign immunity in the
criminal context, [it] . . . could [only] attach . . . pursuant to the principles and
procedures outlined in The Schooner Exchange and its progeny.”).
165
See, e.g., Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)
(declining to apply FSIA to resolve a head-of-state immunity issue).
166
See Keller, 277 F.3d at 819; see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 701.
167
The jurisdictional basis for prosecution of such crimes is often called
“universal jurisdiction.” DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 380–83. Universal
jurisdiction allows any court to hear a claim against any defendant that has violated
the so-called “law of nations.” See id. at 380–82. What constitutes such a violation is
hotly debated and beyond the scope of this Note, but certainly includes piracy, war
crimes, and genocide. Id. at 380.
168
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2006 Supp. II).
169
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining racketeering activity as “any act or
threat involving murder[ or] kidnapping”).
170
473 U.S. 479 (1985).
171
Id. at 488.
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the United States government, our domestic sovereign.172 For
example, the Sixth Circuit in Berger v. Pierce173 held that civil
RICO claims against federal agencies were “defective as a matter
of law” because federal agencies were not indictable.174 While the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the Berger Court, it distinguished
between the immunity available to domestic sovereigns, absolute
immunity, and the immunity available to foreign sovereigns,
restrictive immunity.175
This argument ignores restrictive
immunity theory, as codified by FSIA, which has never
contemplated criminal prosecutions against foreign sovereigns.
Restrictive immunity arose to provide redress to private parties
when commercial transactions with foreign sovereigns soured,176
and no court has used restrictive immunity theory to justify
criminal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.
Third, although the conduct in both Southway and Keller is
properly described as commercial in nature, immunity should not
be excepted in civil RICO claims, which is not the type of relief
contemplated by FSIA. FSIA codified the restrictive immunity
theory to regulate foreign commerce by protecting private parties
in transactions with foreign sovereigns.177 Congress protected
private parties by giving them access to United States courts to
“resolve ordinary legal disputes.”178
But with civil RICO,
ordinary protection crosses the line into private prosecution.
RICO’s unique history and its design as a crime-fighting tool
172

See McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the
FDIC is not indictable); Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding
“that a federal agency is not subject to state or federal criminal prosecution”).
173
933 F.2d 393.
174
See id. at 397; see also McNeily, 6 F.3d at 350 (finding the FDIC is not
indictable and thus cannot engage in a “racketeering activity”). But c.f. Republic of
Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming jurisdiction in civil
RICO claims against the deposed President of the Philippines without discussing the
indictment issue); Am. Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr.,
653 F. Supp. 861, 863–64 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (exercising jurisdiction in a civil RICO
claim against an instrumentality of the French government without addressing the
indictment issue).
175
See Southway, 198 F.3d 1210, 1215 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999).
176
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605–06.
177
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983) (“Congress
expressly exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce.”); see also
Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1001 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (“The purpose of the FSIA is to facilitate suits in United States courts
arising from the commercial conduct of foreign sovereigns.”).
178
Gilson v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43) (emphasis added).
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makes it far from ordinary.179 It seems unlikely that Congress
intended to empower individuals to serve as “private attorneys
general”180 against foreign sovereigns. Such intent would run
counter to international understandings of restrictive immunity,
which were codified in the Act.181 Given this unique nature, it is
unlikely that RICO was within congressional contemplation
when the drafters included the terms “any nonjury civil
action.”182
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of FSIA is
inconsistent with the Act’s underlying purpose. Accordingly,
statutory analysis suggests that the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation better reconciles FSIA’s text with its purpose and
should be adopted by courts.
B.

Alignment with International Law

The Sixth Circuit’s narrow reading of FSIA’s jurisdictional
grant would better align United States practice with
international immunity practices. The United States has always
looked to international practice to shape its own immunity
doctrines; FSIA is no different.183 Indeed, using international law
to temper the “reach of statutes is firmly established in United
States jurisprudence.”184 Up until this point, this Note has

179

See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 80, at 1013–14.
Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103,
137 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)).
181
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43.
182
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006).
183
See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–38
(1812); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6606 (following international law in
codifying the FSIA).
184
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial
reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence.”). Although Justice
Scalia argues in the context of the Sherman Act, this argument applies equally well
to RICO, where extension of the statute’s reach has foreign relations consequences.
Justice Scalia derived this argument from maritime law, where foreign relations
concerns are also prevalent. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 359–60 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953) (“[Resolving]
to apply [The Jones Act] only to areas and transactions in which American law
would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law.”); see
also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21–22,
(1963) (applying the Charming Betsy canon to restrict application of National Labor
Relations Act to foreign-flag vessels). This same logic has been applied to construe
statutes in light of international law in various other contexts. See, e.g., Sale v.
180
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argued that courts lack jurisdiction—the “power to
adjudicate”185—over criminal or quasi-criminal claims against
foreign sovereigns. There is, however, another relevant type of
jurisdiction, so-called “legislative jurisdiction”—the power to
prescribe.186
As is the case here, where the extent of
congressional authority is broad,187 the relevant inquiry is not
whether Congress has power to extend RICO over foreign
sovereigns via FSIA, but whether it has elected to do so.188 This
inquiry considers the relationship of a statute to international
law and is guided by two canons.189
First, the Charming Betsy cannon states that “an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate [customary
international law] if any [alternative] construction remains.”190
Put simply, statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with
customary international law if it can be avoided. While there is
no consensus within the international community on the
particulars of a state’s jurisdictional limits,191 it is well-accepted
that unilaterally imposing criminal liability on sovereign
defendants violates international law.192
Rather, criminal
proceedings against sovereigns or their officials must be brought
before international criminal courts or ad hoc international
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178 n.35 (1993); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456
U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
185
See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813.
186
Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401(a) (1987).
187
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has broad power to regulate foreign
commerce. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620–22 (1927); United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 357 (1909).
188
See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814.
189
See id. Ordinarily there is a third relevant canon, the presumption against
extraterritoriality, which presumes that Congress means for its statutes to apply
only within the United States, unless a contrary intent is evident. See id. at 817.
This canon is inapplicable where United States law is the operative law, as was the
case in Southway and Keller. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 382–83.
190
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
191
See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17
YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 498–99 (1992) (arguing that the international norms that
structure relations, that is “jurisdiction and competence,” are ill-defined and no wellaccepted doctrine exists).
192
See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (holding that Belgium’s issuance of international
arrest warrants against Congo’s incumbent foreign minister violated international
law).
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tribunals.193 Applying the Charming Betsy cannon: Since,
unilateral criminal sanctions against foreign sovereigns are
prohibited by customary international law, courts should
presume that FSIA does not provide for criminal jurisdiction
against sovereigns and that sovereigns are immune from civil
RICO claims because of their quasi-criminal nature.
Second, international comity concerns temper legislative
jurisdictional reach.
In interpreting statutes with
extraterritorial reach, courts should assume that comity concerns
have been incorporated by the legislature in drafting the laws.194
Comity involves “the respect . . . nations afford each other by
limiting the reach of their laws.”195 When determining the
extraterritorial reach of a statute, courts should assume that
Congress did not intend to interfere with the actions of another
nation. Hailing a sovereign to court for a civil matter is itself
disruptive, but it is tolerated as a cost of doing business.196
Imposing criminal liability on another sovereign, however,
impermissibly interferes with the actions of another nation.197
Thus, courts should assume that Congress did not intend to
extend RICO to foreign sovereigns through FSIA.
Moreover, bringing criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings
against foreign sovereigns can embarrass the executive branch
and even result in reciprocal treatment abroad.198 Finally, the
United States does not bring criminal proceedings against
foreign states in peacetime situations.199 Because the policy
implications of indicting a sovereign are significant,200 the

193
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 53–54 (May 31, 2004), available at http:www.scsl.
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7OeBn4RulEg=&tabid=191.
194
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578–79 & n.7 (1953); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609–10 (9th Cir. 1976).
195
See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
196
See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 18.
197
See, e.g., Taylor, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (holding that Belgium’s issuance of
international arrest warrants against Congo’s incumbent foreign minister violated
international law).
198
See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); see also Donoghue,
supra note 191, at 521. Reciprocity implications shaped the Department of State’s
understanding of restrictive immunity. Id. at 521 n.170.
199
See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. at 844 (N.D.
Ohio 1990).
200
See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588–89.

CP_Corrigan (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:09 PM

1502

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1477

decision to extend or curtail the extraterritorial reach of United
States criminal law should not be made by the judicial branch.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis would run contrary to
international law. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis better aligns
United States practice with international law and should be
adopted by courts.
C.

Reduction of Economic Costs

Finally, while the Tenth Circuit’s analysis provides the
greatest level of protection to private parties, it creates
uncertainties that destabilize the market. The Sixth Circuit’s
analysis creates more stability by better balancing the interests
of both private and sovereign parties. Some commentators call
for abandoning the concepts of immunity altogether, in favor of
fostering a contractarian-business climate. Those commentators
argue that “[t]he elimination of immunity promotes the security
of contract and minimizes disruption in the normal rules of the
marketplace, and thus furthers more broadly the interests of the
U.S. economic and political system.”201 Though not without
merit, such arguments ignore political realities. Of course,
denying redress entirely would “stifl[e] . . . international
commerce”202 and would ignore the underlying purpose of
restrictive immunity.203 But subjecting foreign sovereigns to
quasi-criminal actions would have deleterious effects, as
sovereigns would be wary of attracting United States
investments. Exempting foreign sovereigns from civil RICO
liability does not rob transaction partners of judicial protection.204
Rather, ordinary remedies are available under FSIA, and only
those with unclean hands are barred redress in common law
fraud;205 thus, plaintiffs who are complicit in the fraud would
rightly be denied relief. Furthermore, foreign sovereigns are not
afforded the same insolvency protections as United States
citizens,206 and as such, restricting plaintiffs to ordinary litigation
is not so unjust.
201

Donoghue, supra note 191, at 521.
See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 11.
203
See id. at 18.
204
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605–06.
205
See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002).
206
Jeremy Ostrander, Note, The Last Bastion of Sovereign Immunity: A
Comparative Look at Immunity from Execution of Judgments, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 541, 574 (2004).
202

CP_Corrigan (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:09 PM

2010]

RESTRICTING RICO UNDER FSIA

1503

Finally, if private parties desire more protection than that
afforded by traditional litigation other than civil RICO, they can
bargain for a FSIA immunity waiver.207 While private citizens,
even corporate ones, do not always posses the same bargaining
power as foreign sovereigns,208 unequal bargaining power does
not entitle them to act as “private attorneys general”209 against
foreign sovereigns. Certainty and predictability in the law would
help lower transactional costs, as both parties could comfortably
rely on the integrity of agreements without fear of quasi-criminal
reprisal. The current lack of uniformity in the judiciary’s
application of FSIA undermines stability;210 however, allowing
private citizens to prosecute foreign sovereigns would not rectify
the situation.
Because the Sixth Circuit’s analysis better
balances the concerns of both private and public parties, it
creates greater stability and certainty.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis offers several advantages over
the Tenth Circuit’s. Granting foreign sovereigns immunity in
civil RICO claims reconciles FSIA’s text with its purpose, aligns
United States practice with international law, and lowers
transaction costs between private parties and sovereigns.
Although privatization may one day render immunity
questions moot, that day is a long way off. A uniform approach
to immunity is essential to lowering transaction costs and
increasing foreign trade. Any decision to extend or curtail
jurisdiction in criminal or quasi-criminal matters is best left to
the political branches because of the foreign relations concerns
involved.

207

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II).
See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 21.
209
Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103,
137 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)).
210
See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 20.
208

